Platt Holden (email@example.com)
Tue, 18 Aug 1998 16:46:55 +0100
Hi Donny and LS:
Yes, but not because we have social quality, but because
Soc.Quality *has us*. Maybe that's a less "human-centric" way of putting
it that will save us from some flack I sense comming, Platt.
I don't mind being accused of "human centrism" (or "life chauvinistic" for
that matter). It's usually meant as a put down by science types who assume
the world exists independently of our observations in spite of contrary
evidence from their own quantum physicists. So bring on their flack. We can
Anyway, I did say that S-O thinking extends into the animal
kingdom. To clairify: It is present threre *implicitly* -- or in
Hegel-speak: in itself. In socities it becomes for-itself, explicit. This
is where we shift from just (what I'll hence-forth for clairity call)
Object Consciousness, where the subject is present (I can't know not-me if
I don't have some reciprical sense of me) but merely implicit, or (to use
another term Hegel uses) immedeat to Self Consciousness (where the Subject
stands over against itself).
So are we as in agreement as I think we are?
Well, if you say so. I'm having enough trouble with understanding MOQ-speak
without trying to figure out Hegel-speak. To put it as simply as I can, what
sets S-O thinking apart from animals (besides logic) is that even though
they may know that they are separate from others (even cells seem to know
that), they don't know that they know. We do. That's the kicker. When you
know that you know you're egaged in S-O thinking, you've arrived at the
I'm afraid that there we do part. "I'm somebody" happened *well*
before the 6th century. Much closer to the time I described as the
begining of social patterns. Beginings of agriculture = c. 8,000 BCE.
Beginings of city states = 4,000-3,500 BCE w/ anchient Ur of Summaria. Now
certainly people had a sense of there own individuality by that time. I
mean there we get the beginings of hero figures like Sargon I (2300 BCE)
and Mosses (1300 BCE). And not only did they have mirrors, but make-up as
well. You don't have to wait until 6th cen Greece for that. No, I still
set my understanding in opposition to the S-O thinking = Intelectual
patterns idea. Int.poVs are the new kids on the block.
I agree with all of the above. My computer goofed in saying 6th century. It
meant to say 6,000 BC. Somewhere along the line Bo introduced me to this
strange idea that humans didn't always sense that they were individuals.
Maybe he'll be good enough to fill us in on his knowledge in this area.
And so, back to the point I was going to
make, Hegel doesn't (at least not in the *phenominology* -- posibly in the
*phil of History* which isn't as good) mean social as in colective
(contra-individual), he uses social and *moral* interchangably. When he
talks about the "I that is a we and the we that is an I" he means the
individual as a local embodyment of the difuse moral structure that he
identifies as universal man. The two together, individual + universal, =
"the Spirit." But anyway, that's *way* off the subject...
Well, you've pinpointed what scares me about Hegel. His "I that is we and we
that is I" is the collectivist mantra in a nutshell. His "Spirit" could
describe an ant hill. Surely we're above that level.
I've wondered about that myself since I read that section of LILA.
He claims that there is no difference between saying "A causes B" and "B
values precondition A," but there is isn't there. The later implyes a
conscious choice. I mean *something* must be making that valuation, right?
Right. This question "Who is doing the evaluating?" comes up at all levels.
Since metaphysics in your view is about asking questions, perhaps this one
can help us better understand the MOQ? What do you think?
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